Advanced Search
Weather balloon Release
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. Weather balloon release
NOAA P-3 Hurricane Research Aircraft
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. NOAA P-3 Hurricane Research Aircraft National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) P-3 Hurricane research aircraft (12:11), P-3 aircraft into the eye of Hurricane Edouard 8-25-97 to 8-29-97 (13:05).
Gulfstream IV Hurricane Research Jet
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. Gulfstream IV hurricane research jet (13:58) - on ground (fueling?), flying in air, activity on board - someone shows off research equipment for camera. Note: This footage has logo/watermark in corner.
Vortex Experiment
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. Vortex experiment: National severe storms laboratory.
Selected Tornadoes
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. selected tornadoes good severe weather footage.
Subvortex experiment: Poratble Doppler Units
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. subvortex experiment: portable doppler units tornado clouds
Launch of Atlas GOES-K Satellite
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. Launch of Atlas Geostationary orbiting satellite (GOES) K satellite,rocket
massively Parallel Processor
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. Massively Parallel Processor
massively Parallel Processor
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. Massively Parallel Processor and Cray C90 Supercomputer
Meteorologists
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. Meteorologists at the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) - Camp Springs, MD.
Satellite Center
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. Wallops Command and Data Acquisition Center (facility that sends and receives satellite commands and data).
Data Buoys
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. Data Buoys
Microburst ib Radar Screen
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. Microburst on radar screen
Microburst simulation in laboratory
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. microburst simulation in laboratory
Severe Weather Clips
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. severe weather clips (palm trees in hurricane wind and rain, snowstorm and traffic, night flood scene with parked cars, hail viewed from suburban garage, drought with cracked soil)
Weather Archives
Logo in the bottom right cannot be removed from master material. weather archives (old footage of weathercasters and forecasting)
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.41.31] Senator BAKER. Some, of history's great decisions have been nondecisions on occasion. Let me approach it from this standpoint. You say Mr. Mitchell signed off on it. Do you mean physically initialed it or signed it? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir I -mean he said -we Will give Mr. Liddy the $250,000. Senator BAKER. And he identified the targets. Did that include the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate? Mr. MAGRUDER. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator BAKER. Did he do that with a pencil? Mr. MAGRUDER. He, may have. He wrote some things on some documents. I cannot specifically recall what he, -wrote on the documents because, I destroyed the documents. Senator BAKER. Was there any question in Your mind that the, plan Was agreed to by Mr. Mitchell? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir, there, was no doubt. -But it was a reluctant decision. I think that is important to not, It was not one that anyoue was overwhelmed with at all, But it was, made and he did make It- [00.42.23] Senator BAKER. Tell me, more, about why it, was a reluctant decision. can think of a thousand reasons why it was a reluctant decision. But why was it? Mr. MAGRUDER. You probably have all the good reasons, as I do., We knew it was illegal, probably inappropriate. We didn't think that probably much would come of if; but, on the other hand. something may come of it and I think I it was one of those decisions that unfortunately we had 30 decisions, as I recall it, at least 30 decisions we made that day about even greater sums Of money than that, $230,000. Senator BAKER. Did you have any other decision to make that, day that involved any illegal action ? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir. Senator BAKER. Or any clandestine activity? Mr. MAGRUDER. No. sir. Senator BAKER. Did that stand out in your mind as to why you Made that decision reluctantly? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. I think SO. Senator BAKER. Did you ever express any reservations about it? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. sir. Senator BAKER, What did you say? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well. that it. was inappropriate as well as illegal and that it may not work. Senator BAKER. To whom did you say that? Mr. MAGRUDER. To Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, -Mr. Strachan, Senator BAKER. What was -Mr. Mitchell's reply? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think he had similar reservations, sir. Senator BAKER. What did he say? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, by this time, we had some indications of lack of compatibility with Mr. Liddy's behavior and we knew that this was possibly an inappropriate program. Senator BAKER. What -was 'Mr. LaRue's reaction? Mr. MAGRUDER. Similar; he was not overwhelmed With the plan Senator BAKER. What was your reaction? Mr. MAGRUDER. I was not overwhelmed with the program, but, you must. I think, understand that I had personal feelings, relating to Liddy and I was concerned about letting those personal feelings overcome a, possible decision that might be, made. Senator BAKER. What was Mr. Strachan's reaction? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think he, felt uncomfortable with Mr. Liddy. But again, I think -we have, to, in all. honesty, say that we thought there may be Some information that could be very helpful to us and because of a certain atmosphere that had developed in my working at the White House, I -was not as concerned about its illegality as I should have been at that time,. [00.44.37] Senator BAKER. If you were concerned because the action was known to you to be illegal, because you thought It improper or unethical, you thought the prospects for success very meager and you doubted the reliability of Liddy, what on earth would it have taken to decide against that plan? Mr. MAGRUDER. not very much, sir. I am sure that if I had fought it. I think any of us could have had that plan cancelled. It was almost canceled. I had fired him from that position, but reneged on that. 'Senator BAKER. You really leave me dangling, 'Mr. Magruder and I don't attribute any ill motive to you for that. It is just that I still can't quite come to grips with why you all had an expressed reservation about this and you still went ahead with it. Was the incentive so great or the prospects for success so tantalizing that you felt it irresistible? [00.45.35] Mr. MAGRUDER. I knew you would get to this line of questioning, so why don't I give you what I think is the appropriate response here. I had worked for some 2 years, 3 years, really, in the White House and at that time, I was mainly engaged in the activities trying to generate some support for the President both with Mr. Haldeman and as Mr. Klein's deputy. During that time, we had worked primarily relating to the war situation and worked with antiwar groups. Now, I had gone to college, as an example, under--and had a course in ethics as an example under William Sloane Coffin, whom I respect greatly. I have great regard for him. He was quoted the other day as saying, well, I guess Mr. Magruder failed my, course in ethics. And I think he, is correct. During this whole time, we were in the White House and during this time we were directly 37 employed with trying to succeed with the President's policies and I knew how he was trying very diligently to settle the war issue and we were all at that time against the war as an example--I think this is the primary issue-we saw continuing violations of the law done by men like William Sloane 'Coffin. He tells me my ethics are bad. Yet he was indicted for criminal charges. He recommended on the Washington Monument grounds that students burn their draft cards and that, we have mass demonstrations, shut down the city of Washington. [00.46.59]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.46.59--A VERY BIG RATIONALIZATION] Mr. MAGRUDER...Now, here are ethical, legitimate people whom I respected, I respect Mr. Coffin tremendously. He was a very close friend of mine. I saw people I was very close to breaking the law without any, regard for any other person's pattern of behavior of belief. I believed as firmly as they did that the President was correct in this issue. So, consequently--and let, me just say, when these subjects came up and although I was aware they were illegal, and I am sure the others did, we had become somewhat inured to using some activities that would help us in accomplishing what we thought was a legitimate cause. Now, that, is absolutely incorrect; two wrongs do not make a right. For the past year, I have. obviously had to consider that and, understand completely that, that was an absolute, incorrect decision But, that. is basically, I think, the reason why that decision was made. because -of that atmosphere that had occurred and to all of us who had worked in the, White House, there was that feeling of resentment and of frustration at being unable to deal with issues on a legal basis . Senator BAKER. There are countless cliches that come to mind that I could use to try to describe that state of mind or that attitude--fighting 'fire with fire, two wrongs don't make, a right, and all rest. But, they all seem inadequate. Mr. MAGRUDER. Well. they certainly were and I have no justification for them, nor will I make any today. I fully accept the responsibility of having made an absolutely disastrous decision, or at least having participated. I didn't make the decision but, certainly I participated. Senator BAKER. A decision really that is going to affect history that was made in almost a casual way. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Senator BAKER. SO on J January 27, February 4. March 30, 1972, you considered a plan formulated by Mr., Liddy for illegal and clandestine activity. It was put into effect and ultimately led to a. break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at. the, Watergate on May 28, 1972, which went undetected. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator BAKER. We understand from other testimony--I do not remember whether you made the, point or not--that there was criticism of the first break-in. I believe by Mr. Mitchell, that, it, did not produce the desired results and there. was a second break-in effort on June, 17, 1972. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator DARER. And the illegal entry was detected. It. Was reported to you and others, including Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, and Mr. LaRue, during your visit in California,. Mr. MAGRUDER. It 'was reported to Mr. Mardian Mr. LaRue, myself and Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean was not, in California with us. Senator BAKER. Someone, suggested I think Mr., Haldeman, from Key Biscayne, that you should return to Washington on June 19. Mr. MAGRUDER. He suggested it to me. [00.50.03] Senator BAKER. Let's examine that conversation a little more--What was the extent of 'Mr. Haldeman knowledge of the situation? What did he tell you and why did he ask you to return?, Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, I don't know the, extent, of his prior knowledge. Senator BAKER. What did he appear to know? Mr. MAGRUDER. The discussion was simply what had happened. I told him that the break-in had occurred. that the five people had been apprehended, that one of them was Jim McCord, our security chief, that money was found there that was probably our money, although we did not know at that time. He suggested that I get back to Washington to try to solve that matter. Senator BAKER. Can you elaborate that conversation at all? Mr. MAGRUDER. It was a straightforward discussion of the, problem and in effect-Magruder, you get back and try to solve that problem. He did not suggest, and I want to make it clear, that I start any coverup or anything of that kind. He just wanted somebody back there to get hold of the situation. because obviously it was going to deteriorate. Senator BAKER. . Did he tell anyoue else to go back or suggest to you that anyoue accompany you? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, he did not, He specifically asked me to go. [00.51.15] Senator BAKER. What I am going to ask. 'Mr. Magruder,, is patently unfair. to you ,and to Mr. Haldeman, But with that apology in advance and with the full foreknowledge that as far as I am concerned, I am asking for the purpose rather than the content of the conversation, because we will have Mr. Haldeman here later as a witness--can you tell me anything about that conversation the tone of voice, 'the manner the anxiety, the lack of concern--are there any Indices of emotion or content of that conversation that indicate to you that Mr. Haldeman knew how the break-in had been planned a and executed. What Was involved and what had to occur? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think--I have known Mr. Haldeman for a considerable length of time, I have worked for him. I happen to respect him tremendously, still do, will continue to do, because I think he, is an extremely competent and fine individual. But his manner of working, as many of you Senators on the Republican side know, is rather direct, somewhat abrupt. He is not one who engages in long discussions over issues--ate least in his working relationship with People who are subordinate to him, which in effect, although I did not work directly under him at that time, I still was. So our discussion was rather short and rather to the point, rather one of, you have got a problem, You had better solve it. [00.52.35]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.52.35] Senator BAKER. And you went back and on June, 19, you had a series of meetings with who--with Mr. Mitchell? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, On June 19, On the Monday, I met, with Gordon Strachan, John Dean, Gordon Liddy, and Hugh Sloan, primarily. Senator BAKER. Did everyoue of those, people know what had occurred, how it occurred? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Strachan did, Mr. Dean did. I do not know whether Mr. -Sloan did or not. He has indicated he. did not. I accept that at face value. Mr. Liddy, of course, did. Senator BAKER. When did you first begin planning the coverup? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think there was no question that the coverup began that, Saturday when we, realized there was a, break-in. I do not think there, was ever any discussion that there would not be, a coverup. At least,, I did not participate in any discussion that indicated anything else except at one point where we possibly thought that, I might volunteer to become the key figure in the case. Senator BAKER. An historic decision to go forward with this plan was followed with another historic decision to cover it up without any great debate or discussion of the matter. Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct, sir. Now, I think to be, fair, Senator I think at that, point in time, -you have to realize that; One, I -felt, and I can't speak for the, others, that, the President had no knowledge of this plan and consequently, if he had been, if it had gotten out that people like Mr. Mitchell and others had been involved at that point in time, I honestly thought that his reelection would be probably negated. Now, at, that time--- Senator BAKER. Did it ever occur to you--- Mr. MAGRUDER. I knew it was wrong, but I thought it was the best decision to make. Senator BAUER. Did it ever occur to you at that time., and I am not saying this to impugn your character or testimony, but I really want to know, did it ever occur to you that there might be, other alternatives, that one of them might be to report this directly to the President or to the FBI and make a, clean breast of it. at that, moment, that that might have less effect on the election, rather than more effect--- [00.54.47] Mr. MAGRUDER. As I said, we did indicate at one point that we might possibly do that. up to a certain point. I think it was felt that it ever reached Mr. Mitchell before the election, the President would lose, the, election. Since he was not, involved to my knowledge, I thought that was the best decision, I did not think it was a right decision, but I thought it was the best, decision. [00.55.08--THIS IS A VERY TELLING MOMENT, MAGRUDER ANTICIPATES THE TONE OF THE QUESTION AND HINTS AT SOMETHING LARGER] Senator BAKER. Did You think that was a decision for the President to make? Mr. MAGRUDER. Sir, I can't comment as to whether he, did or did not or was involved in I had no dealings directly with the President. Senator BAKER. I am not asking you whether he did or not. that question had been and I am sure will be asked again and again of You and other witnesses. What I am asking you IS whether or not it occurred to you that a decision of that matter ought to be a Presidential decision. Mr. MAGRUDER. I assumed that the higher authorities in the campaign and at the White House would handle it in a way which they thought, was best for the President and I accepted that position Senator BAKER. Is it your testimony, Mr. Magruder---- Mr. MAGRUDER. Since it was also mine, Senator BAKER. Yes, IS it your testimony that, after June 17, in a series of meetings with Mr. Mardian, Mr. testimony Mitchell, and Mr. Dean, there, was never any doubt about your course of action, you were going to go into a coverup operation? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Sir. Senator BAKER. Was there ever any consideration of presenting this material to the President for his information and knowledge and for his determination? Mr. MAGRUDER. Again. Senator, I -would not have been in a position to do that. It would have been people at the Other level, I do not know what occurred between 'Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and the President, There is no way I would have known that question, an answer to that question, sir. Senator BAKER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Senator ERVIN. Senator Inouye. Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Magruder, in a political campaign, numerous decisions are made in a day's time, hundreds. Some are very Important, some unimportant Some involve major policy decisions, Would you consider intelligence gathering in the major policy category? Mr. MAGRUDER. At that time, I did not. I was personally more involved in what I call the technical operations of the committee, Again. Of the $50 million Mr. Stans has indicated we spent that campaign. most of my time was spent on what I would call the substance of the campaign --the direct mail. the advertising. The intelligence gathering was what it was called, I think Mr. Reisner used the term "throw-away." [00.57.51]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.57.51] Senator INOUYE. What about the coverup decision? Mr. MAGRUDER, That -was a major decision. Senator INOUYE. Who would make such a decision? ? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, as I have said. I think, that everyoue who was involved without hesitation agreed to that coverup. Senator INOUYE. I would like, to remind you of January 4-5 1973, at which time you participated in a panel of the Harvard faculty club library sponsored by the Niemann fellowship program and the' Kennedy Institute. I will read from the transcript: [quoting] Jeb, you keep you keep saying "we decided." and so forth, I have a fair idea of who were making the decisions in the Muskie campaign or maybe the McGovern campaign, but I am really curious about the "we" in your campaign. How was your decision-making done? How much was the President personally involved', What was Mitchell's role" What was Haldeman's role? What decisions were you yourself making? How was as it all working'! MAGRUDER. I thought we always made it very clear how our decisions were made. There was basically a triad -of senior decision-making decision-makers--the he President, Haldeman, and John Mitchell until July of 1972. They were in constant consultation with each other over major activities. [end quoted section] Senator INOUYE. Would you like, to comment, sir? a Mr. MAGRUDER. I think that is absolutely consistent with what I have said. I said that Mr. Mitchell and other high officials agreed with this coverup and to my knowledge, I never knew and I think I clarified later in that statement at Harvard that I, myself, never had any direct dealings with the President. I did know that on key campaign decisions at times there was input from the President, I have no knowledge of any input from the President on this decision. Senator INOUYE. But you would consider this a key, major policy decision? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, I think the coverup certainly was a key decision, yes. I think there is an inference there,, Senator, though, that is unfair. to the President. I did not say he had participated in every major decision. I said that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman were the key conduits from our standpoint and that certainly, obviously, certain decisions the President was involved in. Senator INOUYE. They were in constant consultation with each other over major activities? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. Senator INOUYE. In the intelligence-gathering decision, was the matter of national security involved? Mr. MAGRUDER. NO, sir, not necessarily although I think it should be. clear that in my response to Senator Baker, we. had correctly, I think, put together parts of what I would call the left-wing part of the Democratic Party with each of the anti-war activities and we were concerned about their response to the President's candidacy. Now, I do not recall that national security, but I do think it does relate to some. of the reasons why we did get into an extensive intelligence operation. [01.01.24] Senator INOUYE. Learned commentators have suggested that we have at the present time in the White House, two competing organizations, one headed by Mr. 'Mitchell and the, other, by Mr. Haldeman. Did you have two competing organizations? Mr. MAGRUDER. No; I would disagree with that completely. To my knowledge, in every meeting I ever attended with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell, they were on extremely good terms. I never saw, any difficulty in Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Mitchell agreeing. In fact, I think that is one reason Mr. Mitchell agreed to run the, campaign because he, knew Mr. Haldeman would be his chief day-to-day contact at the White House, I disagree with that statement. That has been bandied about, I know. I do not agree with that. Senator INOUYE. Is there a possibility that one group of people, are trying to make another group the scapegoats for this? Mr. MAGRUDER. I cannot--i do not think so. I do not see any evidence of that specific type of activity. Obviously, everyoue now is basically on his own and consequently, it is difficult to say anything is Of coordinated, concerted effort, at this time. I would think most individuals are operating independently of each other at this time- [01.02.48] Senator INOUYE. Several people have been involved in the Watergate and its aftermath, and in most cases, those, involved or identified have Come forth and spoken, either voluntarily or involuntarily. But one, man stands out. He has remained silent. No one seems to be able to move him. Mr. Liddy. Why is he keeping silent, do you know? Mr. MAGRUDER. I have no idea. He is under appeal. I assume he feels he has a better opportunity under appeal than he does by speaking Out now. Senator INOUYE. In your testimony, you discussed Executive, clemency taking care. of the family, paying expenses. Was Mr. Liddy promised anything? Mr. MAGRUDER. My assumption is that he was promised what all the others -were. Senator INOUYE. What were they promised, sir? Mr. MAGRUDER. I do not, know. I only know what I talked about relating to myself Senator INOUYE. What were you promised. sir?, Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, as I indicated before, I talked about, salary, taking care of the family. legal cost. potential Executive clemency, assistance in getting a job, and so on--that type of thing. Senator INOUYE. We have, received testimony that Mr. Strachan was a very important conduit. that. he -was the. liaison---- [01.04.11--TAPE OUT]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.02.00--in to Jeb MAGRUDER testifying about links between the CRP and the White House] Mr. MAGRUDER......Mr. Mitchell agreeing. In fact, I think that is one reason Mr. Mitchell agreed to run the, campaign because he, knew Mr. Haldeman would be his chief day-to-day contact at the White House, I disagree with that statement. That has been bandied about, I know. I do not agree with that. Senator INOUYE. Is there a possibility that one group of people, are trying to make another group the scapegoats for this? Mr. MAGRUDER. I cannot--i do not think so. I do not see any evidence of that specific type of activity. Obviously, everyone now is basically on his own and consequently, it is difficult to say anything is Of coordinated, concerted effort, at this time. I would think most individuals are operating independently of each other at this time- Senator INOUYE. Several people have been involved in the Watergate and its aftermath, and in most cases, those, involved or identified have Come forth and spoken, either voluntarily or involuntarily. But one, man stands out. He has remained silent. No one seems to be able to move him. Mr. Liddy. Why is he keeping silent, do you know? Mr. MAGRUDER. I have no idea. He is under appeal. I assume he feels he has a better opportunity under appeal than he does by speaking Out now. Senator INOUYE. In your testimony, you discussed Executive, clemency taking care. of the family, paying expenses. Was Mr. Liddy promised anything? Mr. MAGRUDER. My assumption is that he was promised what all the others -were. Senator INOUYE. What were they promised, sir? Mr. MAGRUDER. I do not, know. I only know what I talked about relating to myself Senator INOUYE. What were you promised. sir?, Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, as I indicated before, I talked about, salary, taking care of the family. legal cost. potential Executive clemency, assistance in getting a job, and so on--that type of thing. [00.04.05] Senator INOUYE. We have, received testimony that Mr. Strachan was a very important conduit. that. he -was the. liaison between the committee and the White House., that on the, other end was Mr. Haldeman. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. Did you receive any indication that Mr. Strachan did in fact convey those memos and messages that you have been sending to him through Mr. Strachan? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well. Mr. Strachan had a method of working with Mr. Haldeman I am unaware of. because I have seen some of the, documents and that was. he would do a summary sheet capsulizing activities of the campaign, I do not know how often he did it but it was a straightforward memo that condensed much of the information that we would give Mr. Strachan. That was his typical method of dealing with 'Mr. Haldeman I think. Of course, he could give you more information directly. and I gather he usually sent back material when he, thought it was appropriate Senator INOUYE. Did you get any feedback from Mr. Haldeman indicating that he had in fact received memos? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir. [00.05.12] Senator INOUYE. You spoke of a conversation with Mr., Charles Colson in February or March 1972 in which -Mr. Colson urged you to approve the Liddy plan, Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. HOW many Liddy plans were in existence at that time? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, to my knowledge, there was only the one plan that continually was revised downward. Senator INOUYE. So there was no question as to which plan Mr. Liddy was talking about? Mr. MAGRUDER. In that context. I would assume that that is correct. Senator INOUYE. There was no other Liddy--- Mr. MAGRUDER. I knew of no other Liddy plan, no, sir. He was, let me make it clear, doing other minor projects in the intelligence-gathering field but they were, basically of a minor nature. Senator INOUYE. But this was the Liddy plan?, Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. We have received testimony which indicated that you made early morning calls to Key Biscayne right after receipt of the news of the break-in, in fact, a witness testified that you made a call at 4 in the morning. Mr. MAGRUDER. That is incorrect, sir. The only discussion I had with Key Biscayne. was on Sunday with Mr. Haldeman. I talked to the White House, in Washington that day on Saturday. Four in the morning.... Senator INOUYE. Sunday. Mr. MAGRUDER. Sunday, -well, my wife is here and I think she could testify we were, both in bed at that time. We--now, Sunday morning we were, at a fund-- well, a celebrity dinner and it was late when we, got back, late but I do not recall talking to Key Biscayne at that at time in the, morning. Senator INOUYE. You have testified that Mr. Moore and Mr. Liddy met with Mr. Kleindienst at the Burning Tree Country Club. Mr. MAGRUDER. I was told that, sir, yes. Senator INOUYE. . By whom, sir?
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.07.17] Senator INOUYE. So you are. not personally aware of the conversation? Mr. MAGRUDER. I was in California at the time, sir, and he was, Mr. Liddy was, instructed to go out there. Senator INOUYE. Did you have any conversations with Mr. Kleindienst? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir. Senator INOUYE. When you appeared before, the grand jury did the prosecutor ask you anything about Mr. Sloan's testimony that you had requested that he perjure himself? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir, we had a, lengthy discussion with Mr. Silbert and, I think, with Mr. Campbell, I think ink, at that time over that question, and I think they agreed with me, and still do, that there was a difference of opinion. He, was in a certain--he had certain fixed opinions on that situation that I think related more to personal matters, than they did to the, facts in the case. Senator INOUYE. At that time you were lying, were you not? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir; not about my discussions, with Mr. Sloan. Senator INOUYE. Why did they not ask you that in the trial? Mr. MAGRUDER. I am sorry. Why did they not ask me? Senator INOUYE. The prosecutors. Mr. MAGRUDER. Which question? Senator INOUYE. About your suggesting to Mr. Sloan that he perjure himself? Mr. MAGRUDER. I do not think that, was relevant to the case was on the. docket, at that time. The case, had nothing to do with Mr. Sloan. Senator INOUYE. It had something to do with the, Watergate, did it not? Mr. MAGRUDER. You would have to ask the prosecutors why they did not ask that, question. I can see no relevance to a disagreement as to exactly was said between Mr. Sloan and I. I think. Senator, just to follow up, the prosecution, I think last week indicated there was still a difference and that they had agreed with my interpretation of that. discussion. Senator INOUYE. I would like to discuss your discussions with Mr. Haldeman. You had one on the telephone at Key Biscayne. Any others after that.? Mr. MAGRUDER. On the Watergate, Senator? Senator INOUYE. Yes. Mr. MAGRUDER. No, until the January discussion. Then, we met with Mr. Mitchell in April and then I had a couple of phone conversations with his assistant when I--just to let him know that I had decided, because I now had retained independent counsel, that I would cooperate and in cooperating that certain people would be Implicated. [00.09.45] Senator INOUYE. Now, when you discussed this matter in January, I presume that you told Mr. Haldeman everything you knew about the coverup? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think my main Purpose was to just indicate that there were a lot of people involved and that in case people's memory was growing short I hoped he realized it was not myself or any other single individual who was Involved in this Senator INOUYE. This was In January? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. Were you surprised when the President announced that He, had decided to begin an investigation on March 21? Mr. MAGRUDER. Was I surprised Senator INOUYE. Yes. [00.10.33] Mr. MAGRUDER Well, knowing full -well of Mr. Dean's role I could well imagine that the President possibly had been informed incorrectly, since he was investigating his own problem, I could See where he could very easily have misled individuals at the White House, to protect himself Senator INOUYE. But you had notified Mr. Haldeman in January Of the correct activities. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. You expected Mr. Haldeman to communicate with the President did you not? Mr. MAGRUDER. On that matter, sir? Senator INOUYE. Yes. Mr. MAGRUDER. I did not expect--I was talking mainly to be sure that Mr. Porter was taken care of directly after the inaugural and to discuss my own employment situation. I did not expect him to discuss my discussion necessarily With the President unless he felt it was appropriate I did not go to him to go to the President only went to him as the senior man at the White House. Senator INOUYE. But you did discuss the and the coverup, did you not? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes;' but I did it for the purpose Of explaining the total context of the coverup and the Watergate plan. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Magruder, in your testimony this morning you have Indicated that there were several who knew about the coverup such as Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, and I believe you used two words, "and others." Could you tell us about the others? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think Mr., Mardian was to some extent involved.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.12.29] Senator INOUYE. I will list a few names. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Dean knew about, the coverup?, Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Mitchell knew about the, coverup? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Haldeman knew about the coverup? Mr. MAGRUDER. Directly from my knowledge only in January I did not know directly before. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Ehrlichman knew about, the coverup? Mr. MAGRUDER. I did not ever know that, Mr. Ehrlichman knew about the coverup. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Kalmbach? Mr. MAGRUDER. I only knew in Mr. Kalmbach's case he was funding the coverup. [Laughter.] Senator INOUYE. Mr. Mardian. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. I request the audience again to refrain from laughing. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Kleindienst? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir, I did not know of any involvement by Mr. Kleindienst Senator INOUYE. Mr. Gray? Mr. MAGRUDER, No, sir, I had no direct knowledge of Mr. Gray's involvement. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Strachan? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. he was aware of the coverup. Senator INOUYE. Mr. LaRue'? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, he was aware. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Egil Krogh? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Egil Krogh? I cannot specifically recall any direct knowledge that, I would have known that he knew about the coverup. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Colson? Mr. MAGRUDER. I have no direct knowledge that Mr. Colson knew about the coverup. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Howard, Mr. Colson's aide? Mr. MAGRUDER. I don't, think he knew directly about the coverup. I think he realized that we had some, problems that we were taking care of. Senator INOUYE, Mr. Reisner? Mr. MAGRUDER. No. All of the employees of the committee were not involved in the coverup purposely--we made a substantive decision in a sense to be sure. they were not aware of the coverup so that they themselves would not become involved in any problems relating to this coverup. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Stans? Mr. MAGRUDER. Only the. discussion I had in June with Mr. Stans which would indicate some knowledge after that point to some extent. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Sloan? Sloan? ? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, I am sure he knew about the coverup. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Porter. Mr. MAGRUDER. Only to the extent that he has testified that he assisted me for what he thought were legitimate reasons. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Odle ? Mr. MAGRUDER. -No. far as I know he did not- know. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Moore. Mr. MAGRUDER. Again I know Mr. Moore was aware of the trip to Burning Tree Country Club. What Mr. Moore then knew later just. I don't know what Mr. Liddy and Mr. Moore talked about: you would have to talk to Mr. Moore directly. Senator INOUYE. Finally the President? Mr. MAGRUDER. TO my knowledge no, no direct knowledge. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Chairman, I know the time has run out and I thank you very much Thank you very much. Senator ERVIN. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. [00.15.30--Senators, Photographers, others, standing to leave room] [00.15.39--LEHRER IN STUDIO] LEHRER states that the Senators will mull over MAGRUDER's "explosive testimony" over lunch break [PBS network ID--title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.18.07--LEHRER] LEHRER introduces questioning by Sen. WEICKER. [00.18.17--MAGRUDER--ERVIN with gavel] AFTERNOON SESSION THURSDAY. JUNE 14, 1973 Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order. Senator Weicker. Senator WEICKER. Mr. Magruder, on the chart over there, there is indication you received $20,000. Would you tell the committee exactly how you disbursed that money? Mr. MAGRDUER. Yes. sir. I received a request from the White House to disburse $20,000 to a columnist or writer who had done writing work, as I understood it. for the--either for the White House or in relationship to a book that he was writing and so consequently, he requested it. in cash and I requested from -Mr. Sloan $20,000 and gave it to the Writer. Senator WEICKER. Who was the writer? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Victor Lasky. Senator WEICKER. Victor Lasky ; so you paid $20,000 in Cash to 'Mr., Victor Lasky, is that correct? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. Sir. Senator WEICKER. -Now. would you tell the committee, I believe you touched upon On.,; this morning you what Mr. Dean told you after your you your August 16 grand w appearance? Mr. MAGRUDER. He simply notified me the next day that I would not be indicted. Senator WEICKER. DO you have any indication as to the basis for that statement Mr. MAGRUDER. My understanding was It was from official sources. [00.20.03]
1950s - Space Research - Electronic FKR
Two adult Caucasian men in a control room. One man, wearing eyeglasses, speaks into transceiver; looks behind him, reaches out to control panel.