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August 3, 1994 - Part 6
(17:46:04) He was trying to have it both ways. He was trying to be in a position where he could say to Ms. Kulka, to the people in the RTC, to whatever ethics officers that would talk to him, look, I'm going 123 to have nothing to do with this, I've made my decision to turn the whole thing over to Kulka and he could say to the White House, that was clearly in a position of preferring him as the decisionmaker, hey, I have not recused myself, I'm still in the position, you don't need to worry. Now the whole matter became moot because events overtook it. But let us not pay so much attention to the fact that events overtook it that it did happen in this fashion at a time when no one was sure that events were going to overtake it. No one was sure that the Congress was going to extend the statute of limitations. No one was sure that Mr. Altman was in fact not going to be called upon to make a decision. So he had himself set up with the thing looking both ways, And that to me is the problem with the "de facto recusal." It got him into a political pickle, it got him into this kind of controversy, it got him before this Committee for however many hours it was, It created a disaster in his career and I think it is a very illustrative lesson that we will all learn. And when there comes a time when your gut tells you, regardless of what the specifics and technicalities of the law might be, when your gut tells you I better get out of this, you are far better off to follow your gut and stick with it and do not change it and do not say, well, I'll try to be de facto this way and de jure another way. You take your position and you stand with it and that's why Mr. Altman is in so much trouble and that's why this Committee is so exercised about it. Senator D'AMATO, I'd just like to make this point and I thank my friend for yielding. If you put it in writing that is the recusal and you can't take it back, and then you're not even in a position to hear anything or to discuss anything. But if you operated under the guise of a de facto, well, then notwithstanding I'm not going to make a final judgment is there and if there's a problem he can insert himself. And that's my observation and I think it kind of dovetails with Senator Bennett and I thank the Senator for yielding, Mr. KLEIN. Senator Bennett, can I respond to your comment, please? Senator BENNETT, Surely. Mr. KLEIN. I think there are two points you make and I think You want to be clear and we all want to be clear about it. One is a point that I think Mr. Cutler has already spoken to. I think it is well recognized at the White House that it would have been far Preferable if the meeting had not occurred on February 2nd, for some of the reasons in terms that you have laid out here. Mr. Eggleston was there. I was not. I would rely on his account to that meeting. Nevertheless that seems to me to be something Mr. Cutler, has already said. The second point you said, with respect, sir, I do not entirely agree with. I think the White House shouldn't be involved, but the issue of when a person recuses, you may be right that people recuse because in their gut they think they can't do the job. But People may recuse because of political pressure, because it is the easy thing to do. And I, at least, think that is inappropriate, I have practiced before many judges that I have known socially, gone to law school with and 1 consider friends, and I have never had a moment's doubt that they could decide fairly. And I find it interesting, 124 frankly, that Republicans all of a sudden see recusal as a universal panacea when for years they have been the party that opposed the Independent Counsel Law precisely on the ground that the Attorney General of the United States should be held accountable to make the tough calls. And I think we let people avoid the hard decisions. Now I do believe, and I don't want to leave any doubt that that decision belonged to Mr. Altman, should have been made by him and him alone, but I think it is a bad message to send to people that you cannot be fair and impartial and call them as you see them because you know somebody or you are friends with somebody. I strongly disagree with that suggestion, sir.
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August 3, 1994 - Part 6
(17:50:42) Senator BENNETT. I accept that. I think you're right as a general rule and I think that's proper, I don't think that was the circumstance here. As I say, I think Mr. Altman clearly should have and virtually everyone who has looked at it in hindsight has come to the same conclusion including, from his testimony last night, Mr. Altman. May I just ask one purely informational quick question? How many of you are there, how big is the President-is the Office of the Counsel to the President? How many Associate Counsels, et cetera, are there? Mr. KLEIN. There is a Counsel to the President which is now in effect, I hate to say de facto, but it is Mr. Cutler, Deputy Counsel to the President, 7 Associate Counsels on the staff and 3 Assistant Counsels. So that's 12 full-time lawyers. We have in addition some detailees who are assisting us in the hearing, sir. Senator BENNETT. I can remember when there was only one. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bryan. Senator BRYAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate myself with an observation of Senator Kerry made just a moment ago. I have been enormously impressed and very pleased with the candor of the witnesses today in responding to questions. I have to say, it has been in the course of 4 days of hearings but those of you who have had the chance to respond to this panel and one may not agree with your responses, but they have been direct and to the point. And frankly, I've had a sense of frustration in talking to some of our witnesses previously. The thing that I find most troublesome is the testimony of Mr. Altman on February 24th. I think by any standard, given its most charitable interpretation, it was incomplete, and misleading and notwithstanding an opportunity to correct that testimony, it took a series of some four letters subsequent to his testimony, I think that you have served the President well by sensing immediately, as you did, Mr. Eggleston, from your testimony, literally leaving the hearing, as I understood it, and saying wait a minute, we may have a problem here. That, I don't believe is complete. Mr. Klein, you've indicated that although you weren't privy to the meetings that you from what you had been told, also shared a concern. So I think that both your instincts and your judgment were quite correct and I applaud and compliment you for that. Help me to understand, not notwithstanding the good advice-and essentially from your presentation here today both of you are extremely articulate and persuasive men in advocating your causehow did it come to be, as you understand it, that this testimony 125 was not clarified on the March 2nd or at least the letter that followed that. I believe that would have been on the March 11th, I believe-March 3rd, excuse me. March 3rd, I'm greatly troubled by that and somewhat perplexed because you were on top of it. You recognized it. Mr. Eggleston, you called the day before to say, look, is Mr. Altman prepared to answer that. Please share with me what you know from your own knowledge and what you have learned since. Mr. EGGLESTON. Sir, from my own knowledge, I really know "about the activities in the White House starting on the 24th and then through the call that Mr. Podesta made on March 1st. I will tell you that there was a lot of discussion about that call, how to make it. We recognized that the fact that the White House was calling Mr. Altman about his testimony was, in and of itself, a newsworthy event, that that was an event of consequence for the White House to call a Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and suggest that there were aspects of his testimony that he might want to supplement. And in some sense that's a reason it took us a while. We wanted to be careful about how we did it. We wanted to be deliberate about how we did it, but I think we did it fairly quickly, actually, under the circumstances. That call was made, but I just can't help you much [beyond that]. Mr. Altman did not-as far as I know, and maybe he did through others, but as far as I know, he did not consult back with us. I don't think he then sent us the March 2nd letter for our review and say to us, you're the ones who called us. This is what we're going to send back. Is this now OK? I don't recall that he ever communicated back to us to ask whether we thought that he had covered all the issues that we had concern about.
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