Church Committee Hearings - James Angleton
Church Committee Hearings - James Angleton
Church Committee Hearings for James Angleton on September 9, 1975
Church Committee Hearings - James Angleton
Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). Mr. Angleton, you heard Mr. Huston's testimony yesterday? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I heard most of it, sir. Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). You will remember then that he represented to the committee that in response to the President's desire to extend intelligence coverage within this country, that he asked the various departments of the Government involved, the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, to come together with a plan and give the President some options, and that the purpose of the recommendations that were made to the President in the so-called Huston plan, based upon the recommendations that had come from these departments, was to secure the President's authorization to eliminate restrictions that he felt were obstructing this gathering of intelligence. Now, Mr. Huston told us that he was never informed by the CIA, the FBI, or any agency that the mail was being opened. He made a recommendation to the President. The President authorized mail openings, and he testified that to his knowledge the President did not know that the mail was being opened either. Now, when we asked Mr. Helms, the Director of the CIA, if to his knowledge the President had been told of the mail openings, he said, I do not know whether he knew it or not. So the state of the record is that to the best of our knowledge the President had not been told that the mail was being opened. He gets a recommendation in which it is represented that covert coverage, which is mail openings, has been discontinued, and he is asked to authorize the reopening of this program. Now, you have referred to the President as the Commander in Chief. What possible justification was there to misrepresent a matter of such importance to the Commander in Chief? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I would say that your question is very well put, Mr. Chairman. I can only speculate and I do not have any record of the discussions between ourselves and the FBI during the drafting stages, but I know we had several where matters tabled within the drafting committee, were matters that we never explained to the other members, and one of them, of course, was the mail intercept. Again, only by way of speculation, I believe if the President had approved, or even if there had been some access to the President because, I think, this is probably the most difficult task of all, was to have the audience in which these things could be explained I have no satisfactory answer to your question, except that I do not believe that a great deal of the mail problem centered on the Bureau's lack of coverage, not the Agency's.
Church Committee Hearings - James Angleton
Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). But the CIA was the agency principally involved in the mail openings? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. That is correct for all foreign mail, not for domestic. Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). Yes; and we will explore the whole breadth of that program in due course. Did not the CIA have an affirmative duty to inform the President about such a program? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I believe so without any question. Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). But it apparently was not done. You did not inform the President. Director Helms did not inform the President. So James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I would say, sir, not by way of any excuse, but those were very turbulent periods for the intelligence community and particularly for the FBI, and I think that all of us had enormous respect for Mr. Hoover and understood the problems which he had in sustaining the reputation of the FBI. Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). But the fact that the times were turbulent, the fact that illegal operations were being conducted by the very agencies we entrust to uphold and enforce the law makes it all the more incumbent that the President be informed of what is going on; does it not? It is really not an excuse. James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I do not think there was ever the forum in which these matters could be raised at that level. I think that has been one of the troubles in domestic counterintelligence and foreign counterintelligence that the issues never do get beyond the parochial circle of those engaged in that activity.
Church Committee Hearings - James Angleton
Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). But you have said that there was an affirmative duty on the CIA to inform the President? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I don't dispute that. Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). And he was not informed, so that was a failure of duty to the Commander in Chief; is that correct? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone would have hesitated to inform the President if he had at any moment asked for a review of intelligence operations. Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). That is what he did do. That is the very thing he asked Huston to do. That is the very reason that these agencies got together to make recommendations to him, and when they made their recommendations, they misrepresented the facts. James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I was referring, sir, to a much more restricted forum. Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). I am referring to the mail, and what I have said is solidly based upon the evidence. The President wanted to be informed. He wanted recommendations. He wanted to decide what should be done, and he was misinformed. Not only was he misinformed, but when he reconsidered authorizing the opening of the mail 5 days later and revoked it, the CIA did not pay the slightest bit of attention to him, the Commander in Chief, as you say. Is that so? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. I have no satisfactory answer for that. Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). You have no satisfactory answer? James Angleton, CIA Counterintelligence. No. I do not. Senator FRANK CHURCH (D - Idaho). I do not think there is a satisfactory answer, because having revoked the authority, the CIA went ahead with the program. So that the Commander-in-Chief is not the Commander-in-Chief at all. He is just a problem. You do not want to inform him in the first place, because he might say no. That is the truth of it. And when he did say no you disregard it and then you call him the Commander in Chief. I have no further questions.