August 2, 1994 - Part 4
August 2, 1994 - Part 4
(11:00:14) The CHAIRMAN. He turned Mr. Altman around. Mr. Altman went in with one state of mind, prepared to say that he was going to recuse himself and that was not acceptable to the people he was talking to, and they, in effect, caused him to change his judgment, Isn't that what happened? Mr. STEINER. When Mr. Altman returned from the meeting, he said to me that Mr. Nussbaum had made some strong argumentsand it was Mr. Nussbaum I don't believe he said that others had taken positions on it---and he said be was going to sleep on it, The CHAIRMAN. Then how long did he sleep on it before he made the final recusal decision? How many days? Mr. STEINER. He decided the following day. The CHAIRMAN. Was the following day the day of the conversation with the editor of The New York Times? Mr. STEINER. I'm sorry, Senator, I may not have been clear. These events-this February 2 meeting-preceded by almost a month that conversation with the editorial write-up in The New York Times. The CHAIRMAN. That's my point to you. So in other words, he went home to sleep on it and as I understand the record, he slept on it for 20 days. Mr. STEINER. No, Senator. I believe what happened was that Mr. Altman returned from the February 2 meeting, said to me that he Planned to sleep on it. The following day, he decided at that point, be was not going to recuse himself The CHAIRMAN. Not going to recuse himself Mr. STEINER. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. That's very important. So in other words, he changed his mind. On the 2nd he was going to do it. He got all of this feedback, from Mr. Nussbaum certainly, to the contrary. He came back, said he would sleep on it, slept on it, and the next day 'he changed his mind. That's what you've now said, Mr. STEINER. I think what I said, Senator, is that he was planning to recuse himself He had gotten a variety of different pieces of advice from the members of the Treasury staff and he bad now received additional advice from Mr. Nussbaum. The CHAIRMAN. I'm going to stay within my time. I just want to clarify this last point. So then the next day, he changed his mind, decided that be would not recuse himself mil then some On A--- 380 well, Senator D'Amato refreshes me that the next day apparently he went back to the White House and said that he had decided not to recuse himself. So that signal was sent back over there, that he had a change of mind, and that was now his current thinking., is that correct? Mr. STEINER. I was not aware at the time that he had a meeting, but I did become aware of the fact that he had decided at that time not to recuse himself. The CHAIRMAN. And communicated that decision. Mr. STEINER, I was not aware of the fact that he had communicated it. The CHAIRMAN. We'll come back to that. The point I want to nail" down is that he then changed that decision again, did he not? When did that happen? How many days later did that happen, the conversation with Mr. Raines that you refer to in your diary? Mr. STEINER. Approximately 3 weeks later, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. So about 20 days later, he's in a telephone con- versation with the editor, one of the editors at The New York Times, and he decides afresh that he will recuse himself. That's your understanding of what happened? Mr. STEINER. I don't know if he decided prior to his conversation or not. I do know that he said to Mr. Raines that he was planning to recuse himself or had recused himself. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator DAmato. Senator DAMATO. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hatch had just a cou- ple of minutes worth of questions so I'm going to yield to him. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hatch. Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator DAmato" Mr. Steiner, let's go back to February 25-you understood from your February 25 telephone call that Mr. Stephenopoulos thought, that Mr. Stephens should be fired; right? Mr. STEINER. I understood from Mr. Stephanopoulos that he, thought that Mr. Stephens' apparent conflict of interest should dis- qualify him from that position. Senator HATCH. Well, the reason I raise it that way is Jean son in her testimony said: "and I also recall a conversation Mr. Steiner in which he said, 'do you believe those guys? want to see if they can get rid of Jay Stephens.'" You remember that, don't you? Mr. STEINER. No, I do not, Senator. Senator HATCH. So you-could you have said that to Ms. Hanson, who testified to that? Mr. STEINER, I don't recall saying that to Ms. Hanson. Senator HATCH. But you could have said it. Mr. STEINER. Senator, as I said, I don't recall. Senator HATCH. You don't recall one way or the other. Let me ask you this: In your own diary on the 27th, you this is after Howell Raines, you say "but even more amazing George then suggested to me that we needed"--right here even more amazing, when George then suggested to me needed to find a way to get rid of him," you knew that Stephan opoulos had said we'd like to I rid of Mr. Stephens; right? Mr. STEINER. I'm not sure understand your question, Senator 381 Senator HATCH. Did Stephenopoulos ever say to you, did you ever hear them say to you, or did you ever bear of them saying they wanted to get rid of Jay Stephens down there at the White House. Mr. STEINER. I don't recall them saying that, no. Senator HATCH. Even though you put in your diary "but even more amazing when George then suggested to me that we needed to find a way to get rid of him," you wrote that, didn't you. Mr. STEINER. Senator, I've tried to give you as best I can my recollection of that conversation. Senator HATCH Did you write that?