Thai dancers
Thailand misc
Thailand misc.
Thailand - dances
Indian broadcaster - Hong Kong ??
Siam misc.
ON PREVIEW CASSETTE # 210021 Siam - man talking, missionary church, people in church and on street, school, Thailand. (Title sequence looks like that of another item that was produced by the Bible Institute of Los Angeles, later Biola University.) Map shows Southeast Asia in the center. Older white man in business suit speaks to the camera (no audio). Man preaches from a pulpit; the window behind him forms the shape of a cross. The choir (all Asian) sings; so do the people in the congregation. (Church service; mass.) Asian worshippers leaving church shake hands with enthusiastic Caucasian minister (preacher, pastor, missionary). Smiles all around. Children, wearing school uniforms, walk into a building in orderly lines.
Blue Mosque - Istanbul Turkey
Greek changing of guards, mosque in Turkey
ON PREVIEW CASSETTE #991619 Turkey - Istanbul, streets, mosque, harbor
Thailand, misc.
Aerials of mall
Vietnam - KY daily rc #1 on preview cassette 13590
Vietnam daily #2on preview cassette 13590
Vietnam - daily #2 on preview cassette 13590
Vietnam KY daily #3 on preview cassette 13590
Vietnam - daily #4 on preview cassette 13590
Vietnam - key #11 on preview cassette 13590
Tudo St. and night traffic #12 on preview cassette 13590
Vietnam - fofw #13 on preview cassette 13590
746-1 Vietnam - dialy #14 on preview cassette 13590 (600') 746-7 Vietnam #21 (250')
[00.28.50--Paul DUKE in studio] DUKE says that although the votes have been going against the President's allies, they have not given up the effort [PBS network ID] [promos for PBS programming-- 00.29.17, promo for a masterpiece theatre program, in which one man in burgundy velvet smoking jacket upbraids another, who smokes fiendishly, as a "utter SWINE"--it's really too bad that you can't use this, but take a peek if you want to laugh hard] [00.32.18--title screen for "Impeachment Debate"--DUKE in studio] DUKE says that the members are arguing over the language of the second ARTICLE OF IMPEACHMENT. [00.32.30--committee room] Mr. WIGGINS. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wiggins. Mr. WIGGINS. I just have a question of the chairman. There are pending at the desk several motions to strike. The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. Mr. WIGGINS. And I--by reason of not calling them up at this time in advance, of what we call a general debate with respect to the entire article, I hope that there is no waiver of that right. It would be my hope that we -would continue to discuss it under the 5-minute rule and at the conclusion of that, that a, member might be recognized for an appropriate motion to strike if that be his intention. The CHAIRMAN. Well, the gentleman may at any time, be recognized for. that motion to strike. The amendments are at the desk now and the, motion to strike, if it is THE gentleman's desire to be heard on the motion to strike at this time, the gentleman will be recognized in preference to recognition of the members on the question of debate on the substitute. Mr. WIGGINS. Well, it is going to be done sooner or later, Mr. Chairman. I call up No. 2. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized. The clerk will read the amendment. it The CLERK. [reading] Amendment by Mr. Wiggins. In the Hungate substitute strike subparagraph (2). [00.33.46]
[00.39.21] The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed 5 minutes. Mr. WIGGINS. Let me just finish my sentence, and then I shall yield to Others. Those wiretaps were in each case approved by Mr. Hoover, who -was then FBI Director, and in each case was approved by the Attorney General. I would hope the debate hereafter will focus on the, debate -with respect to the President's intentions with respect to the installation of those taps. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Kastenmeier. is recognized for or 4 minutes. Mr. KASTENMEIER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Actually, the debate to on this section was really already begun this morning by the gentleman from Maryland. Mr. Hogan. I think this particular section of article II is central to the. whole theme of abuse Of power. As a free country, we have no higher course. than to protect really our people against this sort of abuse of power which can come in a modern age in terms of a police state. What we did as a Congress in fact as a committee, in 1969 to limit the use of electronic surveillance and wiretapping is as follows: In the Omnibus Crime Control Acts of 1968 which came out of this committee 6 Years ago, we Said that if any lawful authority is to conduct wiretapping or, electronic surveillance. it must have a court order except, except. and I shall read. that the power of the President, to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the -Nation against the following threats, mind you: (1) the actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, (2)) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, (3) to protect national security information against, foreign intelligence activities, and lastly, to protect the United States against overthrow by force or other unlawful means or against any other clear or Present danger to the structure or existence of the government. Now there have been a number of classes of wiretaps. some of which have been alluded to by the gentleman from California. Mr. Wiggins, not necessarily in order of time. The one referred to by the gentleman from Maryland back in 1970 by the Secret Service on Donald -Nixon, which I agree, any reasonable man has to assume occurred with the knowledge and consent and by the direction of the President himself. And subsequent wiretaps and bugging, whether in the Watergate case or implicitly in, the Huston plan. or those undertaken for the President by Mr. Ehrlichman in terms of Mr. Liddy, or Mr. Kraft abroad, Or the 17 wiretaps point to a pattern of use of taps which do not conform to the law as posed by this in 1968. And I submit they are not otherwise authorized by any other decision of the court or by law. Let us go back to the very beginning. How did we ever get there in the first place? How did the President happen to start engaging in wiretaps without any court order in such a mirage of activities? As you know, in any event, the procedure was that all taps would go through the Attorney General of the United States for his approval, whether or not these are warrantless wiretaps, and would be recorded, carried out by the FBI and fully recorded. And as the fact was, later in the year 1971, sensitive about these taps, Mr. -Mardian delivered this list of special White House taps to the White House itself in fact to the Oval Office to be secreted in a safe by Mr. Haldeman. In 1969, apparently following a New York Times article- The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed 5 minutes. Does the gentleman from California wish to yield? [00.44.19]
[00.51.09] Mr. EDWARDS. But that is the fact. I think it is really more important to point out -what was done with the information that resulted from these taps. Mr. Hoover, the Director of the FBI, would send them to the White House, to the President. There was a total from 1969 to 1971--and they went on for more than 2 years--of 104 summaries sent. And what happened? It was found that there had been no leaks of confidential information from these 104 summaries. Nobody went, to jail, nobody was charged , nobody lost their job , nobody was transferred. There were six or seven members of the National Security Council who had their telephones tapped. Four newsman later were tapped, and several White House employees, Most of these people, had no access to any confidential information -whatsoever. And as I pointed out earlier, these summaries indicated that no leaks were going on. Well, how was this information used by the White House? On December 29, 1969, Mr. Hoover wrote to the President and said that former Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, was about, to write, an article for Life. magazine attacking Mr. Nixon on his handling of the Vietnam war, and part of Mr. Clifford's attack was to be regarding Nixon's criticism of President Thieu. Well. immediately this triggered political action by the White House. Presidential assistant, Butterfield wrote Magruder: "The name of the game, of course, is to springboard ourselves into position from which -we can effectively Counter whatever Clifford takes." The suggestion suggested method of countering Clifford's article was sent by Haldeman, the chief political adviser to President Nixon, and included a proposed discrediting of Clifford by use of his prior statements or a counterarticle. Haldeman directed Magruder to be ready to act and suggested finding methods of free action. 'Mr. Haldeman concluded "the key now is how to lay groundwork and be ready to go, and let's act.,' Mr. Ehrlichman characterized the Clifford information as "the kind of early warning we need more of," and he, noted to Mr. Haldeman, "your game planners are now in excellent position to map anticipatory action. The basic nature of the material developed from these 17 wiretaps and sent to the, White House, was political and personal. There were no leaks. The FBI was sending what the White House wanted, and certainly the flow of the information was not, stopped by the White House when the character of the material became, obvious. The material, in addition to the political information on Clark Clifford, contained reports On how certain Senators were expected to vote on legislation, on the activities of critics of the administration's administrative agencies, on the campaign plans of Senator Muskie. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. EDWARDS. Could I have 3 more minutes, please, -Mr. Chairman, of the 20 minutes? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed 4 minutes Mr. EDWARDS. Four minutes, and I will take 2. The CHAIRMAN The gentleman in is recognized for 2 more minutes. Mr. EDWARDS. And information on the social habits and political plans of White House employees. The material had no conceivable relevance to national security, but only could have had political value. I personally reviewed many of these summaries that the FBI sent to the President describing, what was Said over the home telephones of these people under surveillance, and I want to be careful not to describe any of the information in such a way that could get back or be traced to the. people Involved. Suffice 'It to say the conversations were those of citizens, their wives, their children, chatting on the telephone With acquaintances and close friends, confiding their joys, their' sorrows, their anxieties about their personal lives, and in some instances their observations about political and. social events of the United States. These telephone calls were like any calls between close friends where personal disclosures were made, only for the ears at the Other end of the line, and Some of the information would be terribly embarrassing if it, were heard by third parties. The summaries themselves are the strongest evidence of the wisdom of Mr. Justice Holmes' description of wiretapping as "a dirty business." The President authorized these wiretaps. He did not stop it, when they almost immediately proved to be nonproductive. He. knew about them. He discussed them with John Dean on February 28, 1973. He was talking about two of the men who were being tapped, and he said to John Dean, "Incidentally, didn't Muskie do anything had on these? To share with you how the FBI felt about it, this is what two agents said in a memorandum on October 20, 1971. They were talking about why there were no regular records kept of these tapes by the FBI. This is what the two FBI agents said: it goes without saying that knowledge of this coverage represents a potential source of tremendous embarrassment to the Bureau and political disaster for the Nixon administration. Copies of the material itself could be used for political blackmail and ruination of Nixon, Mitchell, and others. [00.56.55]