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August 4, 1994 - Part 7
(16:00:24) The next communication I know about between White House and Treasury officials on this subject occurred on October 14, 1993, On that day, I and several of my colleagues met with officials from the Treasury Department at the White House to discuss additional press inquiries. This meeting took place after Jack DeVore, a press official at the Treasury Department, had received a call from Jeff Gerth of The New York Times about the alleged criminal referrals,. including a suggestion that the referrals were being "bottled up " in Washington, rather than going to the U.S. Attorney's office in Little Rock. My understanding was that Mr. DeVore was seeking guidance on how to respond to the press inquiry. He told us that he had checked and found that the referrals had initially been sent Washington, but that, well before the reporter inquired, they had, been forwarded to the U.S. Attorney's office. Mr. DeVore wished to 359 confirm these facts to the reporter before an incorrect story was written on the subject. He indicated it was standard practice for the RTC to confirm the existence of a criminal referral. I expressed some surprise at this and suggested that Mr. DeVore, rather than confirming the existence of the referrals, should simply respond to the reporter by stating that whatever had been sent from the RTC had been forwarded to the U.S. Attorney's office prior to the reporter's inquiry. No one discussed or suggested that any action should be taken to try to influence the matters that were the subject of the referrals. To my knowledge, other than my checking campaign records with regard to one of the questions the reporter was asking, nothing further was done after October 14, other than Mr. DeVore responding to the reporter's inquiry. In early December 1993, 1 received faxes from two Treasury Department officials of press-generated Freedom of Information Act requests for Madison documents. These came to me without comment, and I took no action in response to them. The final so-called Whitewater-Treasury contact in which I was involved occurred sometime in February 1994, and again was precipitated by a press inquiry: A reporter contacted the press office at the Treasury Department about a meeting between White House and Treasury officials at which there was a briefing on the RTC civil statute of limitations. The reporter said that she understood that, at the meeting, a White I-louse official attempted to pressure the Treasury Department to give a similar briefing to the private attorneys involved in the matter. The press inquiry to the Treasury Department was passed along to the White House press off-lee who passed it along to me. Since I had not attended any White House-Treasury meeting, I called Roger Altman, whom the reporter indicated had attended the meeting, and asked him whether such a meeting had occurred and, if so, what had happened. Mr. Altman told me there was a meeting in early February at which he and other Treasury officials briefed White House officials on the statute of limitations issue. Mr. Altman told me that a White House official had asked him whether a similar briefing would be given to the private attorneys in the matter. Mr. Altman said that he had checked with an RTC attorney who indicated such a briefing would be given at an appropriate time but not now. Mr. Altman told me that no one at the meeting instructed him to do anything. I advised Mr. Altman to respond to the press inquiry accordingly, and I took no further action. I have now informed this Committee of all White House--Treasury Department communications in which I was involved. I have also produced my contemporaneous handwritten notes and memoranda relating to these matters, which I believe fully reflect what I have just recounted. Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, let me restate as clearly as I can: None of these conversations, nor any other action that I am aware of, involved any effort by anybody to influence the conduct of any investigation. They were discussions advising us of press inquiries and discussions about how to respond to them. Nothing improper occurred. I will be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have, 360 GEORGE R. STEPHANOPOULOS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. STEPHANOPOULOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is, George Stephanopoulos and I serve as Senior Policy Advisor to the President. My testimony concerning matters which are the subject of these hearings will focus mainly on two brief telephone conversations, both of which occurred on February 25th. The first occurred with Josh Steiner, Treasury Chief of Staff, concerning Roger Altman's decision to announce his recusal from decisions concerning Madison Guaranty. Mr. Steiner was my regular point of contact at Treasury for obtaining information that affected Administration policy. In the course of that conversation, I asked about the decision to hire former U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, Jay Stephens-a vocal, persistent and public political opponent of the President-to handle the RTC inquiry of Madison. I was puzzled at how he could be hired, given his obvious inability to be impartial, and I asked how that decision was made.
August 4, 1994 - Part 7
(16:05:49) As I have said publicly in the past, I did blow off steam in that conversation, based on my belief that Mr. Stephens had and has a conflict of interest, that he could not be an impartial investigator. Mr. Steiner informed me that the decision had been made by an independent board. That ended the conversation. I took no further action. I believe later that day I had a conversation with Harold Ickes and Roger Altman during which the subject of his recusal was discussed, specifically, as I recall, that he had informed a New York Times editor that he had decided to recuse himself. I was concerned that because of the manner in which he had chosen to announce his decision, the Administration would, for a time, be maintaining inconsistent public positions on this issue. I suggested that, as a courtesy to the President, Mr. Altman write a personal note explaining his decision. I took no further action concerning this issue. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Podesta, why don't you give us your statement now. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Stephanopoulos. JOHN D. PODESTA, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND WHITE HOUSE STAFF SECRETARY, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. PODESTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is John Podesta. I am an Assistant to the President and White House Staff Secretary, a position I have held since inauguration day, January 20, 1993. My principal duties involve managing the paper flow going to and from the President. Earlier in my career, I spent more than 9 years on the staff of two Senate Committees-as Counsel to the Judiciary Committee and for more than a year as Chief Counsel to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. As a result of my Capitol Hill experience, I have from time to time been asked at the White 361 House to work on legislative and congressional matters. It is in this context that my connection to the matter before this Committee took place. On or perhaps just before February 14, 1994, 1 was asked by Mack McLarty and Pat Griffin, the Director of White House Legislative Affairs, to work on upcoming hearings involving RTC matters. Mr. Griffin bad recently joined the White House staff and was concentrating his time and attention on passage of the President's legislative program, principally Health Care reform. In anticipation of upcoming RTC Oversight Board hearings, we expected questions on Madison Guaranty to be raised. My task, as I saw it, was to analyze what was likely to take place at the hearings and to recommend ways to ensure that the hearings were fair and balanced. This assignment was in addition to my regular duties, and did not consume the majority of my time. As best as I can recall, this is a summary of what occurred over the following days. On February 15, 1 met with Mike Levy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and discussed the expected RTC Oversight Board hearing in the Senate Banking Committee. Mr. Levy briefed me on the composition and functions of the RTC Oversight Board. During the remainder of that week, Mr. Levy and I had several telephone conversations concerning the hearing. We never discussed the underlying investigation of Madison, nor did I discuss that subject with anyone else at Treasury or the RTC. Mr. Levy and I did briefly discuss the fact that Roger Altman would need to be prepared to answer questions about recusal in light of the fact that Ricki Tigert, our nominee to chair the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, had been pressured on recusal during her confirmation hearings. I did not, try in any way to influence the substance of Mr. Altman's answer on the subject of recusal. My discussion with Mr. Levy only went to the fact that Mr. Altman needed to be prepared to respond to questions on this subject. In the several days before the hearing, I also spoke by telephone on two or three occasions to Josh Steiner, Secretary Bentsen's Chief of Staff. At this time it is difficult for me to separate these conversations or to remember them with precision. I believe I initiated the first call to ask Mr. Steiner to encourage Secretary Bentsen to take a prominent role at the hearing. Again, this was to ensure that the hearing was broadly focused on our Administration's overall handling of the S&L cleanup and to contrast that record with the record of previous Administrations. About this time I became aware that Mr. Altman had met on February 2 with White House staff. I believe I raised with Mr. Steiner the fact that Mr. Altman probably would be asked a question about whether he had consulted with the White House on the Madison matter, and that he needed to be able to discuss the February 2 meeting in response to such a question. I did not try to influence the substance of Mr. Altman's response. Before the hearing, Mr. Steiner also told me that Mr. Altman planned to put in his opening statement the fact that he intended to leave the RTC when Vacancy Act term expired at the end of March.
The Cuban Crisis
Same as catalog #520372 The Cuban Crisis The United States' answer to what Adlai Stevenson calls in the United Nations: "Soviet Blackmail" is a quarantine of all offensive weapons being shipped from Russia to the island fortress. The U.S. throws up a steel fence, prepared to stop any vessel carrying materials of war. Adlai Stevenson speaking to United Nations (natural audio of speech). Aerial views of ships at sea, battleships, aircraft carriers, etc. In Cuba itself 100,000 men are on emergency orders as they have been during past invasion scares. The waterfront in Havana and along other parts of the coast bristle with gun emplacements as the Cuban regime waits to see what their Kremlin bosses were to do. Cuban soldiers in streets. Patriotic rallies, women carry signs. Fidel Castro seen at rally. The United States arrived at the decision after studying reconnaissance photographs made with high-powered cameras (surveillance ?). Men assemble large camera onto plane, and clean lens. Aerial of plane in flight. Interior shot of camera operator. Photos of missile site and surface to air missile depot. In the greatest display of hemisphere solidarity since World War II the OAS unanimously endorses the actions of the United States. Cuba is absent, empty chair. Sec. of State Dean Rusk ? Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to reinforce its Cuban base at Guantanamo Bay. Air force plane on tarmac, marines exit plane carrying duffle bags. Marines lined up for group photo. Pan down United Nations building. The United States goes to the UN Security Council for a resolution calling for a withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba after President Kennedy refuses to withdraw our arms blockade before the bases are demolished. Adlai Stevenson speaking to United Nations.
1981 Highlights NASA
This video presentation covers Shuttle flights 1 and 2, Spacelab, mobile workstation, Voyager 2 Saturn, Infrared Astronomy Satellite, Hubble Space Telescope, Kuiper Airborne Observatory, High Altitude Earth Survey, Landsat, aerodynamic research, electric cars, wind energy, XV - 15, Quiet Shorthaul Research Aircraft, X -14 BVTOL, 40 x 80 Wind Tunnel, and turboprop research. (playing time 14 minutes, 30 sec. Dec. 1981)
August 4, 1994 - Part 7
(16:10:38) In the several days following Mr. Altman's February 24 testimony, I spoke to Mr. Steiner on three or four occasions. On February 25, Mr. Steiner told me that Mr. Altman had recused himself 362 from Madison matters. Mr. Steiner also told me about the procedures the RTC went through in hiring Jay Stephens, the former Republican U.S. Attorney, to pursue RTC civil claims arising out of the Madison failure. Finally, following a meeting on March I at the White House at which Mr. Nussbaum, Mr. Klein, Mr. Eggleston, Mr. Sloan, Mr, Lindsey, and I discussed Mr. Altman's testimony, I spoke with Mr. Altman about the possible need to supplement his testimony oil three points-first, how the February 2nd meeting was arranged; second, the fact that the recusal was discussed at the February 2nd meeting; and third, whether anyone from the RTC had advised the White House of the criminal referrals involving Madison. Mr. Altman and I had what in my view was a constructive con- versation on the three points, which resulted the next day in Mr' Altman's letter supplementing the record concerning the fall meetings. Mr. Altman later sent a letter on the recusal point. I had no subsequent conversations with Treasury or RTC personnel that related in any way to Madison Guaranty. That concludes my prepared remarks and I look forward to an-. swering your questions. The CHAIRMAN. Let me pick up right where you left off. The discussion you had on the phone with Mr. Altman where you made the three points as to omissions in his testimony that he was going to have to fill in, what was the date of that? Mr. PODESTA. March 1. The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that you mentioned recusal as one of the three items? Mr. PODESTA. I did. The CHAIRMAN. Are you surprised, in his letter of March 2 that he sent to us, that recusal is not mentioned there? Or on March 3? There's another letter that follows. Mr. PODESTA. Mr. Chairman, I think I need to give you something of a long answer to that, if you'll bear with me. It really, I think, needs to be answered in the context of all three points. I mentioned The CHAIRMAN. I'm going to let you do that, but I want to make sure that I've established the predicate for the question that I want you to respond to. Mr. PODESTA. I understand. The CHAIRMAN. I want to be clear in my mind when you had the conversation with Mr. Altman and you mentioned these items, that one of them was the recusal issue. This happened on Mr. PODESTA. March 1. The CHAIRMAN. On March 1. Mr. PODESTA. Let me give you a short-winded answer and then I can give you a long-winded one. Of the three points we discussed, these had been the subject of a meeting, as I mentioned, between four members of the Counsel's Office and Mr. Lindsey and I through the course of the afternoon on March 1st. When I talked to Mr. Altman, I think that those of us on the White House side viewed those three issues somewhat differently. With regard to the first question about how the meeting had been arranged, it was Mr. Nussbaum, I think, who was particularly concerned that Mr. 363 Altman had said that he had asked for a meeting with Mr. Nussbaum. And I think the testimony has shown that he believed that he called Mr. McLarty to set up the meeting, but then asked for Mr. Nussbaum to attend. I think all of us in the White House, with perhaps the exception of Mr. Nussbaum himself, felt that was a matter that would probably not need to be supplemented. It didn't seem, in our view, to be something the Committee would be particularly concerned about or that there would be a strong press reaction to. The CHAIRMAN. Let me do this. I'm going to give you Mr. PODESTA. I'm going to rank these. The CHAIRMAN, I just want to talk about recusal right now. I'd like to leave the other two aside because I want to pose a question to another witness here on this point. Mr. PODESTA. On the recusal point, I think it was our view that the better course was to supplement the testimony and mention recusal, but that it was a judgment call that should be left to Mr. Altman on that point. The CHAIRMAN. The main point I want to establish here is that you flagged that for him on March 1st, and you have no doubt in your mind about that. Mr. PODESTA. I have no doubt in my mind about that. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ickes, in the meeting on February 2nd, yesterday Mr. Eggleston estimated that he thought about half the meeting was spent on the recusal issue. What would be your recollection on what percentage of the time of the meeting would have been spent on the recusal issue? Mr, ICKES. Senator, as I sit here today, it's my best recollection that probably three-quarters of the meeting was spent on the statute of limitation, the balance on recusal. The CHAIRMAN. When I look at your handwritten notes, which have been transcribed and printed on a piece of paper, you have that, I assume? Mr. ICKES. I have that if you'll bear with me a moment, Yes, I have it, The CHAIRMAN. In going through your transcription of notes, I don't find anything about recusal. Can you tell me why that is?
August 4, 1994 - Part 7
(16:15:40) Mr. ICKES. I can't explain why not. As I say, I think-my recollection is that it came up at the latter part of the meeting, not that much time was spent on it, Senator. The bulk of the meeting was spent on the issue of the statute of limitations. The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't it be reasonable though, the fact that it did come up and there was some discussion about it and different points of view, you would expect that it would show up on your notes as what happened at the meeting? Mr. ICKES. One might think so, but it's not-it's not-I don't think it's inexplicable that I didn't put it down there. As I say, it was a matter that came up toward the last of the meeting. I don't recall much time being spent on it. The CHAIRMAN. On page 7 of your testimony, you say here toward the end of the February 2nd meeting, Mr. Altman also stated that he was considering recusing himself from the Madison matter. Can you remember how he said it? What did he say? 364 Mr. ICKES. As I recall, Senator, toward the end of that meeting, he indicated he was giving consideration whether to recuse himself or not and there ensued, I don't think a very long- The CHAIRMAN. Before we go to what followed, I want to try to get as clear a memory as you have as to what he would have said Mr. ICKES. I can't-as I've said, Senator, before the Senate coun- sels and in other situations in connection with these hearings, don't have an exact recollection word for word. I recall the gist 0 it was that he said toward the end of the meeting that he was con sidering recusing himself. The CHAIRMAN. Now, he's testified to us here that he had reached the decision to recuse himself before this meeting. Therefore, the presumption is that he came in and said that to all of you that were gathered at that meeting, that he had reached the judgment to recuse himself. Are you saying that he did not say that? Mr. ICKES. It is my best recollection, as I sit here today, Senator, that I do not recall him saying that he had decided to recuse himself, I recall that he was considering recusing himself, The CHAIRMAN. Let me just read to you what was on his briefing sheet that he had and had gone over before he went in, and I will read the text, "I have decided that I will recuse myself from the decisionmaking process as interim CEO of the RTC because of my relationship with the President and Mrs. Clinton." This document supports his recollection of his decision, and his preparation and intention to go in and to say that. You say that when he got there, he did not say that. Mr. ICKES. I can only give you my best recollection, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. Now, after he said whatever precisely it was that he said about recusal, did he then, did he put it in a form where he said I'd like your opinion? Mr. ICKES. As I said, Senator, I don't recall word for word. There was some discussion that followed his statement that he was considering recusal. The CHAIRMAN. Here's my point, and I think you will understand where I'm going here. I'm wondering if he made the comment in a form in which he was, in a sense, putting you on notice, or whether he made the comment from the point of view saying, I'm thinking about this and now I'd really like your opinion on it so let me hear from all of you as to what your reaction is. Mr. ICKES. I don't recall him putting that, certainly not in the latter form. He stated, as I recall, the gist of it was that he was thinking about recusal, and there was some discussion following that statement. The CHAIRMAN. I'm going to run out of time, but the interesting part of this is the discussion that then follows. Who said what an in what order and in what manner, So I'd like you, before my time expires, to tell me who was the first person that responded insofar as you can recall? Mr. ICKES. Senator, this happened a long time ago. A lot Of things have happened in between that. I have a very busy schedule, as do you all. Much has merged from what has been discussed in the press and otherwise. I cannot recall the specifics of who spoke first, who spoke second, nor word for word what they said. I can only give you the gist. 365 The CHAIRMAN. I would expect that type of answer, frankly, I think for most of us, What did Mr. Nussbaum say? Mr. ICKES. As I recall, Mr. Nussbaum, as did I, as did others, asked what the basis for his thinking that he might want to recuse himself, and as I recall, Mr. Altman basically said that he felt that he had a-not that he felt that he did, in fact, have a very long friendship with the Clintons, with both the President and Mrs. Clinton, and thought that that might be a basis for recusing himself, but it is my very distinct recollection, Senator, that he had not yet decided. It is also my very distinct recollection that all par-ties at that meeting said that it is up to him to decide whether or not to decide whether he would recuse himself.